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ABSTRACT	
Independent	members	(IMLCs)	have	long	dominated	the	Tasmanian	Legislative	Council	
(Council)	and	are	expected	to	play	a	review	and	scrutiny	rather	than	a	policy-making	role.	
However,	this	article	presents	research	that	finds	that	such	members	are	indeed	able	to	
achieve	policy	influence	despite	their	lack	of	supportive	party	colleagues	or	a	party	structure.	
Current	and	former	IMLCs,	one	Labor	MLC,	and	one	Member	of	the	lower	House	of	Assembly,	
were	interviewed	for	this	research.	They	were	asked	about	the	IMLC	role	as	they	see	it,	the	
strategies	used,	if	in	fact	they	are	used,	to	gain	policy	influence,	IMLC	work	and	influence	on	
committees,	and	the	obstacles,	including	political	obstacles,	to	IMLCs	achieving	influence.	Our	
paper	addresses	the	lack	of	studies	of	the	legislative	behaviour	of	Councillors,	and	establishes	
that,	despite	the	review	and	scrutiny	focus	of	their	role,	and	the	attribution	of	the	policy-
making	role	to	the	lower	house,	IMLCs	do	seek	influence	and	use	various	means	of	achieving	it.	
	
‘Tasmania	has	been	well	served	by	an	upper	house	dominated	by	independents	–	they	are	there	
to	knock	the	rough	edges	off	government’1	
	
	
INTRODUCTION	
	Westminster	upper	houses	are	not	known	for	their	power	to	determine	policy,	indeed	the	
literature	typically	suggests	that	to	pursue	such	power	would	be	to	be	seen	to	usurp	the	policy-
making	role	of	lower	houses.	However	the	(elected)	Australian	Senate	initiates,	reviews,	and	
																																								 																				
1	Tony	Mulder	IMLC	2011-17,	See	G.	Burgess,	and	E.	Gramenz,	‘Fresh	Calls	to	Curb	the	Powers	of	Tasmania’s	
Upper	House’,	ABC	News	20	June	2017.	
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amends	legislation	and	is	thus	extremely	influential2.	The	parliamentary	decline	thesis,	which	
sees	Westminster	parliaments	as	dominated	by	the	executive,	is	less	persuasive	in	such	
circumstances,	as	it	is,	we	suggest,	in	the	case	of	Tasmania3.		Some	question	the	legitimacy	of	
Westminster	upper	houses	like	Tasmania’s	having	any	policy-making	power	or	influence,	
beyond	their	roles	in	reviewing	legislation	and	scrutinising	the	executive4.	However	clearly	
there	are	varying	circumstances5	that	impact	in	differing	ways	upon	influence.	Our	focus	is,	
however,	not	upon	context,	process6,	or	upper-lower	house	dynamics,	but	upon	the	influence	
that	Tasmania’s	IMLCs	may	have,	or	believe	that	they	have,	in	their	review,	scrutiny	and	policy	
roles,	in	amending	and	proposing	bills,	and	in	operating	in	committee	environments.	
Whatever	the	context	or	make	up	of	a	Westminster	upper	house7,	there	are	two	features	that	
matter	in	terms	of	influence,	namely	whether	the	house	has	democratic	legitimacy,	as	an	
elected	body,	and	whether	government	dominates	numbers.	Westminster	upper	houses	that	
are	appointed,	the	House	of	Lords	and	Canadian	Senate	for	example,	are	arguably	less	
legitimate	and	potentially	less	likely	to	exercise	a	policy	role,	indeed	some	of	their	powers	may	
be	limited	and	some	of	their	roles	subject	to	review8.	On	the	other	hand,	being	elected,	
Australia’s	Senate	is	democratically	legitimate,	and	because	it	is	elected	by	proportional	
representation,	government	rarely	dominates.	It	also	has	a	range	of	powers	that	enable	
senators	to	play	an	active	role	and	to	influence	policy9.		
In	Tasmania,	the	Council	is	democratically	legitimate	for	being	elected	by	a	preferential	system,	
even	though	elections	are	out	of	synch	with	general	elections,	funding	is	limited,	campaigns	
																																								 																				
2	M.	Russell,	and	M.	Benton,	‘(Re)assessing	Parliamentary	Policy	Impact:	The	Case	of	the	Australian	Senate’,	
Australian	Journal	of	Political	Science	45(2)	2010:	159-174.	
3	B.	Stone,	‘Bicameralism	and	democracy:	The	transformation	of	Australian	state	upper	houses’,	Australian	Journal	
of	Political	Science	37(2)	2002:	267-281;	A.	Lijphart,	Patterns	of	Democracy:	Government	Forms	and	Performance	
in	Thirty-Six	Countries,	London,	Yale	University	Press,	1999.	
4	M.	Stokes,	‘The	Future	Role	and	Function	of	the	Legislative	Council’,	in	Fletcher.	A	(ed.),	Operation	of	the	
Legislative	Council:	Discussion	Brief,	Tasmania,	Parliament	of	Tasmania,	1997:	39-54.	
5	M.	Russell,	and	P.	Cowley,	‘The	Policy	Power	of	the	Westminster	Parliament:	The	Parliamentary	State	and	the	
Empirical	Evidence’,	Governance	29(1)	2016:	121-137;	M.	Flinders	and	A.	Kelso,	‘Mind	the	Gap:	Political	Analysis,	
Public	Expectations	and	the	Parliamentary	Decline	Thesis’,	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	
13(2)	2011:	249-268.	
6	G.	Tsebelis,	Veto	Players:	How	Political	Institutions	Work,	New	Jersey,	Princeton	University	Press,	2002.	
7	J.	Money	and	G.	Tsebelis,	‘Cicero's	Puzzle:	Upper	House	Power	in	Comparative	Perspective’,	International	
Political	Science	Review	13(1)	1992:	25-43.	
8	Lijphart,	Patterns	of	Democracy.	
9	S.	Bach,	‘Mandates,	Consensus,	Compromise,	and	the	Senate’,	Papers	on	Parliament	No.	48,	Canberra,	
Parliament	of	Australia,	2008.	
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are	subdued,	and	party	policies	are	not	usually	canvassed10.	These	circumstances	do	however	
routinely	see	independents	returned.	Indeed	they	have	dominated	the	Council	continuously,	
unlike	in	any	other	upper	house	in	the	world11,	which	predisposes	them	to	being	influential	in	
ways	that	we	will	examine	here.	The	Council	can	also	send	the	lower	house	to	an	election	
without	facing	one	itself12,	and	is	thus	extremely	powerful.	Tasmania’s	case	is	worthy	of	
investigation,	therefore,	because	it	has	such	a	Legislative	Council;	because	it	is,	unusually,	
dominated	by	independents;	and	because	the	legislative	behaviour	of	the	IMLCs	and	their	
pursuit	of	influence	is	little	known	and	worthy	of	investigation.		
Our	research	is	qualitative,	and	interview	informed.	We	employ	a	variety	of	research	
techniques	and	materials:	literature	review,	parliamentary	statistics,	various	legislative	
examples,	interviews,	and	we	included	a	case	study	for	analysis.	Ours	is	a	positivist	study	that	
makes	no	judgements	of	IMLCs’	actions,	although	self-evidently	some	of	these	will	be	
politically	or	ideologically	based,	and/or	motivated	by	self-interest	or	the	needs	of	
constituents.	We	are	agnostic	as	to	whether	influence	is	a	legitimate	activity	for	an	IMLC	in	an	
upper	house	because	this	was	beyond	the	scope	of	our	inquiry.	We	sought	qualitative	evidence	
of	influence	by	speaking	with	those	who	responded	to	our	requests	for	interviews	–	i.e.	five	
IMLCs,	one	Labor	MLC,	formerly	the	Leader	of	the	Government	in	the	Legislative	Council,	and	
one	Member	of	Parliament	(to	gain	the	perspective	of	the	Tasmanian	Greens)13.		
Attempts	were	also	made	to	represent	the	political	spectrum,	hence	the	inclusion	of	Green	and	
Labor	members,	however,	no	Liberal	member	agreed	to	participate,	so	claims	made	by	
interviewees	about	Liberal	members	are	not	included.	The	Tasmanian	Forest	Agreement	(TFA)	
																																								 																				
10	In	2019,	the	fifteen	members	of	the	Council	include	four	ALP	MLCs,	two	Liberal	MLCs	and	nine	IMLCs.	
11	L.	Weeks,	‘Parliaments	Without	Parties’,	Australasian	Parliamentary	Review	30(1)	2015:	61-71.	
12	N.	Fewkes,	‘Tasmania's	Legislative	Council	elections:	Is	reform	needed?’	Australasian	Parliamentary	Review	
26(2)	2011:	87-98.	
13	Seven	Members	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament	were	interviewed:	
1. 	Hon.	Rob	Valentine	-	Independent	MLC	first	elected	2011		
2. Hon.	Ivan	Dean	-	Independent	MLC	first	elected	2003		
3. Hon.	Sue	Smith	-	Independent	MLC	first	1997-2013	and	President	of	the	Legislative	Council	2008-2013		
4. Hon.	Ruth	Forrest	-	Independent	MLC	first	elected	2005		
5. Hon.	Jim	Wilkinson	-	Independent	MLC	first	elected	1995	and	President	of	the	Legislative	Council	2013-
2019		
6. Hon.	Craig	Farrell	-	Labor	MLC	first	elected	2011,	Leader	of	the	Government	in	the	Legislative	Council	
2012-2014	and	President	of	the	Legislative	Council	2019-present	
7. Ms	Cassy	O’Connor	-	Greens	MHA	first	elected	2008,	Leader	of	the	Tasmanian	Greens	and	Cabinet	
Minister	2011-2014	
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study	was	included	in	our	analysis	by	way	of	offering	the	details	and	interpretation	of	a	
concrete	illustration	of	the	actions	and	influence	of	IMLCs;	and	because	this	was	the	most	
complex,	politicised	bill	that	the	Council	has	dealt	with	in	recent	times14.	It	was	the	subject	of	a	
select	committee	and	was	heavily	amended.	There	were	claims	of	politicisation	during	this	
process.	IMLC	Paul	Harriss,	who	opposed	the	TFA	process,	subsequently	resigned,	ran	for	the	
Liberals	in	the	House	of	Assembly	election,	and,	as	a	newly	elected	minister,	abolished	the	TFA	
altogether.	
Our	work	contributes	a	novel	‘independents	and	policy	influence’	perspective	to	the	literature	
on	Westminster	upper	houses,	parliamentary	procedure,	and	policy	development.	The	
transferability	of	its	findings	may	be	limited,	given	its	reliance	upon	the	experiences	of	IMLCs	in	
a	small,	regional	parliamentary	jurisdiction.	However	it	adds	in	general	to	the	body	of	
knowledge	about	the	roles	of	independents	in	Westminster	upper	houses,	with	its	focus	on	
parliamentary	procedure	in	the	areas	of	policy	initiation	(private	members	bills),	legislative	
review,	and	scrutiny	of	the	executive.	It	identifies	strategies	of	influence	by	IMLCs	that	can	be	
more	fully	investigated	by	future	research	that	could	look	more	broadly	at	MLCs,	including	
more	explicitly	at	party	political	members.	We	offer	qualitative	insight	into	the	role	of	IMLCs	
which	highlights	the	need	for	further	research	into	the	dynamics	of	the	Tasmanian	parliament	
itself	more	broadly	given	the	historical	dominance	of	independents	in	the	Legislative	Council.		
	
THE	LEGISLATIVE	COUNCIL:	REVIEW,	SCRUTINY	AND	INFLUENCE	
The	Legislative	Council	(Council)	was	established	in	1825,	predating	the	House	of	Assembly	
(Assembly);	with	equal	powers	to	the	Assembly	once	that	was	established	in	185615.	Each	May,	
a	number	of	councillors	from	single	member	electorates	are	elected	by	a	preferential	system	
for	staggered	six-year	terms16.	This	‘out	of	cycle’	procedure	with	its	emphasis	on	name	
recognition	and	local	issues	has	favoured	independents17.	The	Council	recently	supported	a	
motion	(10:3)	acknowledging	that	its	ability	to	block	Assembly	budgets	could	be	replaced	with	
																																								 																				
14	Farrell	Interview.	
15	G.	Griffith	and	S.	Srinivasan,	State	Upper	Houses	in	Australia.	NSW,	Australia,	NSW	Parliamentary	Research	
Service,	2001,	p.	19.	
16	C.	Sharman,	‘Limiting	Party	Representation:	Evidence	from	a	Small	Parliamentary	Chamber’,	Legislative	Studies	
Quarterly	38(3)	2013:	327-348.	
17	D.	Hamer,	Can	Responsible	Government	Survive	in	Australia?,	Canberra,	Department	of	the	Senate,	2004.	
Accessed	at:	https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/hamer	
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a	suspensory	veto,	which	could	lapse	after	a	month18.	However	it	is	currently	constitutionally	
entitled,	not	to	initiate	money	bills,	but	to	reject	them,	with	requests	that	they	be	amended	
and	returned,	without	facing	an	election19	20	21.	
The	Council	is	therefore	one	of	Australia’s	most	powerful.	Until	recently,	it	was	better	known	
for	its	conservatism,	indeed	for	some	MLCs	their	alignment	with	the	Liberal	party,	than	for	any	
more	radical,	Labor	or	Green	leanings22.	From	its	beginnings	as	an	upper	house,	it	was	
intended	to	check	the	democratic	spirit	of	the	masses,	to	guard	against	hasty	and	
inconsiderate	legislation,	and	to	proceed	as	a	conservative	body,	cautiously	and	deliberately23		
24.	Despite	its	conservative	history,	Bonham25	identifies	a	more	recent	‘left-biased’	voting	
pattern	in	the	Council,	with	IMLCs	now	leading	reform	debates	on	mandatory	sentencing,	
transgender	laws	and	police	powers26.	If	the	Council	had	this	composition	during	the	Labor-
Green	government	(2010-14),	it	would	likely	have	passed	bills	on	marriage	equality,	voluntary	
assisted	dying,	and	land	returns	to	the	Aboriginal	community,	and	passed	the	TFA	bill	‘in	very	
short	order’27.	
However,	the	independent	character	of	the	Council	does	reduce	the	executive	dominance	that	
is	characteristic	of	Westminster	systems	elsewhere.	This	is	reflected	in	the	observations	by	
IMLCs	about	their	roles.	IMLC	Valentine	observed	that	the	Council	‘is	not	there	to	be	a	rubber	
stamp,	it’s	there	to	examine	and	to	pull	apart,	line	by	line,	the	[government’s]	legislation	and	
to	make	sure	that	there	aren’t	any	unintended	consequences,	that	there	is	consistency’28.	Of	
all	our	interviewees,	only	Valentine	qualified	the	seeking	of	influence	by	IMLCs	as	a	seeking	of	
influence	within	the	bounds	of	the	agenda	that	is	put	before	the	Council	by	the	government	of	
the	day.	The	other	interviewees	were	all	comfortable	with	influence	seeking	more	generally,	
																																								 																				
18	P.	Chapman,	‘Brave	Move	Must	Trigger	Reform’,	The	Mercury	2	February	2018.	
19	Supply	has	been	blocked	by	the	Legislative	Council	only	once,	in	1948.		
Griffith	and	Srinivasan,	State	Upper	Houses	in	Australia;	T.	Morling,	Report	of	the	Board	of	Inquiry	into	the	Size	and	
Constitution	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament,	Hobart,	Tasmania,	Department	of	Premier	and	Cabinet,	1994.	
20	Griffith	and	Srinivasan,	State	Upper	Houses	in	Australia;	T.	Morling,	Report	of	the	Board	of	Inquiry	into	the	Size	
and	Constitution	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament,	Hobart,	Tasmania,	Department	of	Premier	and	Cabinet,	1994.	
21	It	should	be	noted	that	changes	to	Tasmania’s	Constitution	require	only	a	simple	parliamentary	majority.	
22	Griffith	and	Srinivasan,	State	Upper	Houses	in	Australia.	
23	Fewkes,	Tasmania's	Legislative	Council	elections;	T.	Newman,	Tasmania’s	Constitution	and	Bicameral	
Parliament,	Tasmanian	Parliamentary	Library,	Parliamentary	Research	Service,	Issue	Brief	91/8	1991:	4-19.	
24	See	also	-	http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/Backg/Parliament.htm.	
25	K.	Bonham,	‘Legislative	Council	Voting	Patterns	2014-18’,	Polling	analysis	blogspot,	2018.	Accessed	at:	
http://kevinbonham.blogspot.com/2018/03/legislative-council-voting-patterns.html	
26	G.	Barns,	‘Don’t	let	Legislative	Council	become	a	Rubber	Stamp’,	The	Mercury	29	April	2019.	
27	O’Connor	Interview.	
28	Valentine	Interview.	
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with	most	agreeing	however	that,	even	though	they	represent	single	member	electorates,	any	
influence	seeking	must	benefit	the	entire	State.	
Reports	by	Beaumont29,	Ogilvie30,	Morling31	and	Nixon32	confirm	the	review	and	scrutiny	role	
of	the	Council33.	The	review	function	entails	taking	a	‘second	look’	at	government	bills	to:	
technically	improve	them;	protect	citizen	liberties;	and	ensure	that	affected	interests	and	
opinions	are	accounted	for34.	We	consider	this	role	in	terms	of	IMLCs	review	and	amendment	
of	government	bills,	and	in	their	initiation	of	private	members	bills,	which	have	tended	to	be	
about	refining	processes35.	The	scrutiny	role	‘includes	a	range	of	parliamentary	activities:	
scrutiny	of	administrative	institutions	and	processes;	investigation	of	particular	administrative	
decisions;	review	of	the	administration	of	particular	policies;	and	examination	of	public	
expenditure’36.	We	consider	the	roles	played	by	IMLCs’	on	committees,	and	their	specific	work	
in	reviewing	and	revising	the	TFA.	We	asked	our	interviewees	about	IMLCs	review	and	scrutiny	
roles,	the	strategies	they	use	to	gain	policy	influence,	their	work	and	influence	on	committees,	
and	the	obstacles,	including	political	obstacles,	to	their	achieving	influence.	What	follows	here	
is	a	compilation,	distillation	and	analysis	of	their	responses.	
	
AMENDMENTS	AND	PRIVATE	MEMBER’S	BILLS		
There	have	been	contrasting	perceptions	over	time	that	the	Council	is	both	a	rubber	stamp37,	
and	obstructionist	for	blocking	government’s	agenda38.	What	is	less	emphasised	is	the	role	
that	IMLCs	themselves	believe	they	play	in	terms	of	review,	scrutiny	and	policy	initiation	and	
influence.	Our	interviewees	suggest	that	the	review	and	scrutiny	role	involves	fine-tuning	bills	
in	order	to	ensure	that	they	do	what	they	intend;	that	they	do	not	have	unintended	
																																								 																				
29	B.	Beaumont,	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	into	the	Constitution	Act,	1934,	Tasmania,	Hobart,	Parliamentary	
Library,	1982.	
30	G.	A.	Ogilvie,	Report	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	the	Proposed	Reduction	in	the	Number	of	Members	Elected	to	
Both	Houses	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament	to	the	Premier	the	Honourable	Robin	Trevor	Gray,	Hobart,	Tasmania,	
Government	Printer,	1984.	
31	Morling,	Inquiry	into	the	Size	and	Constitution	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament.	
32	P.	Nixon,	Tasmania	into	the	21st	Century:	Commonwealth	State	Inquiry	into	the	Tasmanian	Economy,	Hobart,	
Government	Printer,	1997.	
33	Stone,	Bicameralism	and	democracy.	
34	B.	Stone,	‘Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules:	Procedural	Development	and	Difference	in	Australian	State	Upper	
Houses’,	Australian	Journal	of	Political	Science	40(1)	2005:	33-50.	
35	With	at	least	one	notable	exception	-	IMLCs	Ivan	Dean’s	Tobacco-Free	Generation	bill.	
36	Stone,	Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
37	Chapman,	Brave	Move	Must	Trigger	Reform.	
38	Smith	Interview;	Beaumont,	Report	into	the	Constitution	Act.	
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consequences;	that	they	are	‘tidied’	up	in	terms	of	any	flaws;	and	that	they	are	the	best	they	
can	be,	at	times	‘tweaked’	or	re-thought	in	order	to	achieve	better	outcomes.	Bills	may	be	
amended	for	these,	or	other,	reasons,	however	IMLCs	also	introduce	private	members’	bills	
(PMBs)39	to	influence	procedures	and	policy.			
	
Amending	Bills		
The	Council	has	a	constitutionally	backed	blocking	majority	and	the	government	will	need	to	
secure	its	support	to	pass	bills40.	IMLCs	may	negotiate	amendments	in	return	for	concessions	
if	they	enjoy	a	constructive	relationship	with	government41,	however	horse-trading	for	
support	is	frowned	upon42.	The	Leader	of	the	Government	in	the	Council	(LGLC)	will	look	for	
common	ground	recognising	‘that	sometimes	getting	seventy-five	per	cent	of	something	is	
better	than	getting	nothing’43.	Given	the	lack	of	a	supportive	party	political	environment,	
personal	relationships	are	important.	This	includes	the	need	for	an	open	door	policy	to	all	
MLs/IMLCs	by	the	LGLC44.	Government	doesn’t	like	its	agenda	being	held	up	by	the	Council,	
and	it	may	drop	a	bill	if	there	are	too	many	amendments	proposed45.	
The	Council	has	been	relatively	active	in	amending	bills.	Previously,	Hamer46	claimed	that	it	
amends	forty	to	fifty	per	cent	of	bills,	many	heavily,	and	that	Conferences	of	Managers	from	
the	two	houses	were	used	to	resolve	differences.	Statistics	for	the	period	1947	to	1995	show	
that	at	such	Conferences	the	government	made	33	(27%)	of	concessions,	the	Council	made	21	
(17%),	with	52	(42%)	joint	concessions,	and	that	there	were	16	(13%)	failures	to	gain	any	
resolution47.	However,	the	Conferences	of	Managers	were	removed	from	Standing	Orders	in	
1996.	Table	1	demonstrates	that	from	May	2014	to	June	2018,	of	the	bills	passed	by	the	
Council,	only	about	one	quarter	were	amended.		
																																								 																				
39	N.	Dixon,	‘The	Role	of	Private	Members'	Bills’,	Australasian	Parliamentary	Review	19(1)	2004:	88-115.	
40	Farrell	Interview.	
41	Smith	Interview.	
42	Smith	Interview.	
43	Smith	Interview.	
44	Farrell	Interview.	
45	Valentine	Interview.	
46	Hammer,	Can	Responsible	Government	Survive	in	Australia?.	
47	Griffith	and	Srinivasan,	State	Upper	Houses	in	Australia.	
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Figure	1:	Breakdown	of	results	of	all	bills,	government	and	non-government,	introduced	into	
Council	from	2014-201848.		
	
Amendments	may	also	be	proposed	on	the	floor	of	the	Council,	and	be	adopted	by	
government.	Otherwise	amendments	from	the	floor	are	more	likely	to	succeed	where	the	
case	is	well	put,	and	the	Member	is	well	respected	by	colleagues49.	IMLCs	are	‘lone	voices’50.	
They	may	not	have	caucused	their	bills.	They	do	not	vote	in	a	block,	so	it	is	harder	work	than	
it	is	for	party	political	members	to	gain	support.	Neither	can	they	pass	work	onto	colleagues51.	
The	form	of	an	amendment	is	important,	but	IMLCs	do	not	have	the	resources	of	parties	to	
draft	amendments.	Drafting	assistance	is	at	the	discretion	of	government	following	a	written	
request	from	the	LGLC.	Past	governments	have,	however,	been	known	to	not	allow	this	only	
to	subsequently	argue	that	the	bill	won’t	be	supported	because	it	is	poorly	drafted52.	
Strategies	to	influence	policy	through	amendments	can	be	seen	in	the	passage	of	the	
Workplaces	(Protection	From	Protesters)	Bill	2014	which	aimed	to	prevent	protests	that	
obstruct	business	operations53.	In	the	Council	committee	stage,	Committee	of	the	Whole54,	
																																								 																				
48	This	table	is	presented	as	it	is	in	the	Tasmanian	Legislative	Council’	Annual	Report	2017-2018,	Hobart,	
Legislative	Council	of	Tasmania,	2018,	p.	18.	
49	Smith	Interview.	
50	Forrest	Interview.	
51	Dean	Interview.	
52	Forrest	Interview;	The	Hon	L	Giddings	MP,	Tasmania,	House	of	Assembly,	Hansard,	18	November	2010,	p.	68.	
53	B.	Gogarty,	‘Bob	Brown	wins	his	case,	but	High	Court	leaves	the	door	open	to	laws	targeting	protesters’,	The	
Conversation	18	October	2017.	Accessed	at:	
https://theconversation.com/bob-brown-wins-his-case-but-high-court-leaves-the-door-open-to-laws-targeting-
protesters-85742	
54	This	is	‘the	legislative	stage	that	follows	debate	of	the	principles	at	the	second	reading’	as	in	Stone,	Changing	
Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
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scores	of	amendments	were	proposed,	from	both	government	and	IMLCs	55.	The	LGLC	in	turn	
offered	significant	amendments,	saying	that	the	issues	raised	by	IMLCs	had	caused	the	
government	to	adopt	that	course	of	action56.	IMLCs	proposed	further	substantive	
amendments,	including	the	narrowing	of	the	bill’s	scope57.	The	government	supported	these	
and	the	bill	was	ultimately	accepted	by	the	Council’s	Committee	of	the	Whole.		
	
Private	Member’s	Bills		
In	the	Council,	in	2017-18,	fifty-nine	per	cent	of	sitting	time	was	spent	on	government	
business,	thirteen	per	cent	on	government	briefings,	and	twenty-nine	per	cent	on	non-
government	business58.	Part	of	non-government	business	is	the	initiation	of	IMLCs	PMBs,	six	
of	which	have	been	introduced	to	the	Council	since	2010.	
• Electoral	Amendment	(Legislative	Council	Ballot	Papers)	2010	
• Constitution	Amendment	(Legislative	Council	Proceedings)	2011	
• Public	Health	Amendment	(Tobacco-Free	Generation)	2014	
• Electoral	Amendment	(Legislative	Council	Ballot	Papers)	2015	
• Fire	Service	Amendment	(Fire	Infringement	Notices)	2015	
• Legislative	Council	Electoral	Boundaries	Amendment	2017	
Few	of	such	bills	become	law.	Government	support	is	key	to	their	success59,	for	example	IMLC	
Mike	Gaffney’s	Amendment	(Fire	Infringement	Notices)	Bill	2015	was	developed	with	
government	and	became	law.	However,	some	bills	are	introduced	in	the	knowledge	that	they	
will	never	become	law60.	Instead	they	put	‘government	on	notice’61	by	profile	raising	and	
agenda	setting62.	IMLC	Ivan	Dean’s	Tobacco	Free	Generation	Bill,	has,	for	example,	promoted	
tobacco	control,	even	though	his	bill	has	thus	far	failed	to	achieve	support63.	Generally,	
																																								 																				
55Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	5	November	2014,	p.	3-89.	
56	The	Hon	V	Goodwin,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	5	November	2014,	p.	21.	
57	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	5	November	2014,	p.	26.	
58	Legislative	Council,	Annual	Report	2017-2018.	
59	Valentine	Interview;	Dixon,	The	Role	of	Private	Members'	Bills’.	
60	O’Connor	Interview;	Forrest	Interview.	
61	Wilkinson	Interview.	
62	A.	Brazier	and	R.	Fox,	‘Enhancing	the	Backbench	MP's	Role	as	a	Legislator:	The	Case	for	Urgent	Reform	of	
Private	Members	Bills’, Parliamentary	Affairs	63(1)	2010:	201-211.	
63	O’Connor	Interview;	Forrest	Interview.	
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‘governments	just	want	to	be	the	ones	who	write	the	legislation	and	control	it’64.	But	they	are	
happy	for	an	IMLC	bill	to	test	the	waters,	and	may	return	to	tobacco	control	in	future65.		
A	version	of	IMLC	Jim	Wilkinson’s	PMB	became	law.	He	introduced	the	Financial	Management	
and	Audit	(Quarterly	Reporting)	Amendment	Bill	2011	to	increase	scrutiny	of	the	executive	by	
requiring	Treasury	to	release	quarterly	financial	reports66.	It	passed	the	Council	but	was	
blocked	by	government67.	The	next	year,	the	government	introduced	its	own	Financial	
Management	and	Audit	Amendment	Bill	2012,	which	was	largely	consistent	with	the	
Wilkinson	bill,	but	was	presented	as	the	government’s	initiative68.	IMLC	Wilkinson	suggested	
that	his	bill	had	strong	support	and	had	made	a	case	for	the	change69.		Even	though	it	was	
rejected,	it	subsequently	had	a	direct	influence	upon	government	action.	
	
COMMITTEES	AND	POLICY	INFLUENCE	
Committees	are	significant	features	of	Westminster	parliaments70	for	their	scrutiny	of	
government,	and	influence	over	policy71,	notably	within	Tasmania’s	Legislative	Council72.	
Stone	observes	that	the	Council	has	a	rigorous	approach	to	the	policy	review	of	legislation	by	
committee	with	‘a	mini-inquiry’	conducted	into	‘every	substantial	or	controversial	piece	of	
legislation’73.	Such	inquiries	include	government	briefings	and	hear	from	those	supporting	and	
opposing	bills,	leaving	the	Council	well	informed	and	affording	a	smoother	passage	for	passing	
bills74.	Stone’s	comparative	review	of	upper	houses	does	show,	however,	that	the	Council’s	
committee	system	is	compromised	by	its	relative	lack	of	adequate	administrative	support.	
The	Council	also	participates	in	formal	committees,	with	its	work	on	joint	committees,	
however	arguably	compromising	its	independence,	lessening	its	influence	and	undermining	
																																								 																				
64	O’Connor	Interview;	Brazier	and	Fox,	Enhancing	the	Backbench	MP’s	Role	as	a	Legislator.	
65	Dean	Interview.	
66	Wilkinson	Interview.	
67	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	21	June	2012,	p.	52.	
68	Wilkinson	Interview;	The	Hon	P	Gutwein	MP,	Tasmania,	House	of	Assembly,	Hansard,	24	May	2012,	p.	74-76.	
69	The	Hon	Wilkinson	MLC,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	21	June	2012,	p.	60.	
70	J.	Halligan	and	R.	Reid,	‘Conflict	and	Consensus	in	Committees	of	the	Australian	Parliament’,	Parliamentary	
Affairs	69(2)	2016:	230-248.	
71	Stone,	Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
72	D.	Monk,	‘Committee	Inquiries	in	the	Australian	Parliament	and	their	Influence	on	Government:	Government	
Acceptance	of	Recommendations	as	a	Measure	of	Parliamentary	Performance’,	The	Journal	of	Legislative	Studies	
18(2)	2012:	137-160.	
73	Stone,	Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
74	Stone,	Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
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bicameralism75.	MLCs	sit	upon	Joint	Standing	Committees	(Integrity,	Public	Accounts,	Public	
Works	and	Subordinate	Legislation),	Sessional	Committees	(examining	government	bills	and	
administration),	ad	hoc	Select	Committees,	Estimates	Committees,	Government	Business	
Committees	and	Joint	Committees.	In	our	interviews,	IMLCs	identified	instances	of	policy	
influence	in	the	Joint	Public	Accounts	and	Subordinate	Legislation	Committees,	despite	
Stone’s	concerns,	and	in	the	Council’s	Select	and	Sessional	Committees,	including	significant	
influence	over	the	contentious	Tasmanian	Forest	Agreement	Bill.	
	
Public	Accounts	(Joint)	Committee	influence?	
The	Public	Accounts	Committee	(PAC)	is	established	by	statute,	with	equal	numbers	from	
each	house,	and	can	look	at	any	issue	pertaining	to	State	finances	(Public	Accounts	Committee	
Act	1970).	It	exercises	influence	by	scrutinising	the	executive76,	and	is	considered	by	some	to	
be	‘probably	the	most	powerful	committee	within	the	parliament	in	the	world’77.	In	Tasmania,	
it	can	provide	a	check	on	a	‘government	heading	in	the	wrong	direction’78.	Recent	influence	of	
the	committee	can	be	seen	in	its	review	of	the	financial	position	of	government-owned	
energy	agencies	following	the	2015-16	energy	crisis	and	the	Treasurer’s	refusal	to	release	
relevant	Treasury	advice79.	Despite	this	conflict,	it	is	likely	that	the	government	will	adopt	the	
PAC’s	recommendations	for	transparency	and	an	improved	response	to	future	crises80.		
	
Subordinate	Legislation	(Joint)	Committee	influence?	
Many	Acts	delegate	to	a	Minister	or	agency	the	ability	to	make	rules,	regulations,	and	by-laws	
under	legislation81.	These	do	not	require	parliamentary	approval,	but	are	subject	to	
retrospective	review	through	the	Subordinate	Legislation	Committee	(SLC)82.	If	the	committee	
finds	a	lack	of	compliance	with	the	relevant	Act,	it	can	refer	rules,	regulation	and/or	by-laws	
																																								 																				
75	Stone,	Changing	Roles,	Changing	Rules.	
76	J.	O’Dea,	‘The	Role	of	Public	Accounts	Committees’,	Australasian	Parliamentary	Review	27(1)	2012:	191-195.	
77	Dean	Interview.	
78	Smith	Interview.	
79	Public	Accounts	Committee	(PAC),	Report	on	the	Financial	Position	and	Performance	of	Government-Owned	
Entities,	Hobart,	Tasmania,	Parliament	of	Tasmania,	2017.	
80	Dean	Interview.	
81	G.	Appleby	and	J.	Howe,	‘Scrutinising	Parliament's	Scrutiny	of	Delegated	Legislative	Power’,	Oxford	University	
Commonwealth	Law	Journal	15(1)	2015:	3-40.	
82	R.	Laing,	Odgers’	Australian	Senate	Practice:	As	revised	by	Harry	Evans	(14th	ed.),	Canberra,	Department	of	the	
Senate,	2016.	
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to	the	Council	or	Assembly	to	be	disallowed83.	IMLCs	sit	on	the	SLC,	exerting	influence	by	
scrutinising	government	action,	but	also	in	disallowing	rules,	regulations,	and	by-laws	found	
to	be	non-compliant84.	Furthermore,	the	Council	may	need	to	put	the	disallowance	motion,	
where	the	government	fails	to	do	so85.	
Disallowance	motions	are	rare,	however	the	SLC	can	be	influential	in	more	subtle	ways86.	For	
example,	in	2013,	it	initiated	an	inquiry	into	the	operation	of	a	regulation	providing	for	
mandatory	alcohol	interlocks	to	be	installed	in	the	cars	of	repeat	drink	drivers	(SLC,	2013).	
The	SLC	gave	notice	in	the	Council	of	its	intention	to	disallow	this	regulation,	should	the	
responsible	agency	not	satisfactorily	amend	it87.	The	SLC	withdrew	its	notice	of	motion	to	
dismiss	the	regulation	once	the	changes	had	been	made88.	Attempts	by	IMLC	Ruth	Forrest	to	
enhance	the	disallowance	power	to	allow	it	to	operate	prospectively,	in	the	government’s	
view	by	setting	policy,	passed	the	Council	but	failed	in	the	Assembly.	The	grounds	were	poor	
drafting,	although	the	IMLC	had	been	denied	any	drafting	assistance89.	
	
Legislative	Council	Sessional	and	Select	Committee	influence?		
Whilst	Council	sessional	and	select	committees	are	broadly	similar,	the	former	are	established	
to	deal	with	bills	and	government	administrative	matters	referred	to	the	Council,	whilst	the	
latter	can	be	created	on	the	Council’s	own	initiative90.	The	scrutiny	that	Estimates	
Committees	provide	in	the	Senate	is	crucial	in	holding	the	executive	accountable	for	its	
budgets91.	During	2013	Tasmanian	Estimates	hearings,	for	example,	IMLC	Ivan	Dean	
questioned	Ministers	over	high	levels	of	overtime	payments	to	prison	staff92.	The	Minister	
then	agreed	to	an	inquiry	that	recommended	significant	changes,	many	of	which	were	
																																								 																				
83	Office	of	Parliamentary	Counsel,	Manual	for	the	Preparation	of	Statutory	Rules,	Hobart,	Tasmania	Department	
of	Premier	and	Cabinet,	2010.	
84	R.	Snell,	H.	Townley,	and	D.	Vance	‘The	Tasmanian	Subordinate	Legislation	Committee	-	Lifting	the	Scrutiny	Veil	
by	Degrees’,	Deakin	Law	Review	4(2)	1999:	1-37.	
85	Forrest	Interview.	
86	Snell,	Townley	and	Vance,	The	Tasmanian	Subordinate	Legislation	Committee.	
87	Subordinate	Legislation	Committee,	Mandatory	Alcohol	Interlock:	Final	Report,	Hobart,	Tasmania,	Parliament	of	
Tasmania,	2013.	
88	Subordinate	Legislation	Committee,	Mandatory	Alcohol	Interlock:	Final	Report.	
89	Forrest	Interview;	The	Hon	L	Giddings	MP,	Tasmania,	House	of	Assembly,	Hansard,	18	November	2010,	p.	68.	
90	Smith	Interview.	
91	J.	Hogg,	‘Throwing	Light	into	Dark	Corners:	Senate	Estimates	and	Executive	Accountability’,	Papers	on	
Parliament	No.	54,	Canberra,	Parliament	of	Australia,	2010.	
92	Government	Administration	Committee	B,	Final	Report	on	the	Overtime	Costs	of	the	Tasmanian	Prison	Service,	
Hobart,	Parliament	of	Tasmania,	2013.	
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subsequently	implemented93.	Estimates	Committees	therefore	offer	a	useful	process	for	an	
IMLC	to	gather	information,	identify	problems	and	influence	policy	change,	as	well	as	to	
scrutinise	government.	
Influence	is	not	apparent	where	government	rejects	recommendations,	and	fails	to	commit	to	
others94	as	it	did	with	the	recommendations	of	the	IMLC	initiated	2016	Inquiry	into	Built	
Heritage	Tourism	in	Tasmania95.	However,	the	literature	suggests96,	and	certainly	the	
interviewees	felt,	that	such	reports	may	still	influence	policy	at	some	later	stage,	indeed	some	
IMLC	ideas	re-emerge	as	government	suggestions	many	years	later97.			
[The	report]	will	be	sent	to	the	government	and	generally	there	is	silence.	But	
18	months	down	the	track	you	might	see	an	amendment,	a	piece	of	legislation	
come	in	and	you	think	hahaha,	here	is	the	end	result.	They	have	picked	it	up	as	
their	idea.98		
	
Furthermore,	IMLC	Sue	Smith	observed	that	the	Council	committee	system	is	respected	by	
governments	for	its	fairness	and	independence	from	politics,	which	increases	the	chance	that	
its’	recommendations	will	be	adopted.	IMLCs	also	have	influence	for	working	more	easily	with	
government	than	if	they	were	partisan	players99,	as	they	capture	evidence	and	public	opinion	
to	better	inform	decision-making100.	All	interviewees	agreed	that	committees	are	an	
influential	processes,	as	was	illustrated	by	their	various	descriptions	of	the	role	of	IMLCs	in	
resolving	an	outcome	for	the	highly	complex	Tasmanian	Forests	Agreement	bill.	This	bill	had	
sought	to	break	a	deadlock	between	conservationists	and	forestry	interests	over	the	logging	
of	contested	areas	with	arguably	high	conservation	value.	Given	the	difficulties	of	achieving	
accord	between	these	conflicting	interests,	the	Labor-Green	government	at	the	time	was	
keen	for	the	bill	to	proceed	quickly	through	the	Legislative	Council.	However	by	leveraging	the	
committee	process,	and	their	roles	within	this	process,	IMLCs	ensured	that	this	was	not	so.	
	
																																								 																				
93	Dean	Interview;	Government	Administration	Committee	B,	Overtime	Costs	of	the	Tasmanian	Prison	Service.	
94	P.	Lobban,	‘Who	Cares	Wins:	Parliamentary	Committees	and	the	Executive’,	Australasian	Parliamentary	Review	
27(1)	2012:	178-190.	
95	Valentine	Interview;	M.	Groom,	Response	to	the	Final	Report	on	the	Inquiry	into	Built	Heritage	Tourism	in	
Tasmania,	Hobart,	Tasmanian	Government,	2017.	
96	Monk,	Committee	Inquiries	in	the	Australian.	
97	Forrest	Interview.	
98	Smith	Interview.	
99	Smith	Interview.	
100	Dean	Interview.	
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Tasmanian	Forests	Agreement	-	Select	Committee	influence?	
The	Tasmanian	Forests	Agreement	(TFA)101	was	indeed	a	contentious,	complex	government	
bill,	which	was	intended	to	end	the	forest	wars	by	protecting	high	conservation	value	forests	
whilst	ensuring	industry	viability	into	the	future102.	A	Labor-Green	government	initiated	a	bill,	
and	its	resolution	was	negotiated	through	a	Council	select	committee	process.	This	process	
provided	a	clear	example	of	how	IMLCs	influence	procedures	and	policy	through	the	process	
of	legislative	review	by	leveraging	the	crucial	committee	process.	At	the	time,	the	Council	was	
seen	by	critics	to	be	operating	conservatively,	in	concert	with	the	conservative	Liberal	
opposition,	by	resisting	the	TFA	forest	‘peace	process’103,	as	well	as	for	the	length	and	depth	
of	its	extensive	review	process,	and	for	the	amount	of	revisions	it	proposed	to	the	bill.	
But	others,	including	IMLCs,	argued	that	neither	the	delicate	negotiations	between	
conservation	and	forestry	interests,	the	TFA	signatories,	nor	the	bill’s	passage	through	the	
Assembly,	had	allowed	for	sufficient	consultation104.	The	Council	therefore	established	a	select	
committee	to	review	the	bill105.	'They	say	they	consult.	Sometimes	the	Legislative	Council	says,	
well	yeah,	you	haven't	consulted	far	enough…'	as	IMLC	Rob	Valentine	observed106.	This	process	
was	to	‘inform	us	(the	Council)	and	to	ensure	that	we	had	all	the	evidence	and	information	that	
we	needed’107	in	order	to	propose	what	were	in	the	end	substantive	amendments	to	the	bill108.		
The	Council	established	a	select	committee	of	the	entire	Council,	and	held	hearings,	working	
over	Christmas,	in	order	to	produce	a	report	for	circulation,	whilst	being	heavily	lobbied,	and	at	
times	threatened,	over	a	quite	‘horrendous’	period109.	For	the	Greens,	who	supported	the	
Labor	minority	government	and	its	forest	peace	process,	this	was	a	dishonest,	delaying,	
‘wrecking	process’110.	However	the	Council’s	consultation	and	evidence	gathering	process,	and	
its	public	airing	of	views,	did	deliver	the	legitimacy	that	was	previously	lacking111	and	did	
enable	IMLCs	to	feel	justified,	in	terms	of	the	evidence	they	acquired,	in	heavily	amending	
																																								 																				
101	Details	are	archived	at	-	http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/ctee/Council/Forests.htm	
102	Farrell	Interview.	
103	O’Connor	Interview.	
104	J.	Schirmer,	M.	Dare	and	S.	Ercan,	‘Deliberative	Democracy	and	the	Tasmanian	Forest	Peace	Process’,	
Australian	Journal	of	Political	Science	51(2)	2016:	288-207.	
105	Valentine	Interview;	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	13	December	2012,	p.	56.	
106	Valentine	Interview.	
107	Dean	Interview.	
108	Valentine	Interview.	
109	Dean	Interview.	
110	O’Connor	Interview.	
111	Schirmer,	Dare	and	Ercan,	Deliberative	Democracy	and	the	Tasmanian	Forest	Peace	Process.	
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what	had	otherwise	been	a	‘skeleton’	bill112.	LGLC	Farrell	engaged	constantly	with	the	Council,	
offering	government	amendments	to	alleviate	its	concerns,	even	when	the	government	did	not	
agree	with	them113.	‘(M)ore	often	than	not	he	(Craig	Farrell)	would	say,	well	I	will	talk	to	the	
minister’114.		
	IMLC	Ruth	Forrest	offered	the	most	significant	amendments,	which	had	the	greatest	impact	
on	the	government’s	version	of	the	bill,	including	several	pages	of	new	clauses	to	create	a	
framework	to	govern	compensation	schemes115.	These	were	supported	by	the	government,	
which	saw	them	as	strengthening	the	bill116,	and	by	a	majority	of	MLCs.	However	the	Council’s	
proposals	very	nearly	did	upset	the	delicate	conservation-	forestry	balance,	with	the	
government	ultimately	supporting	the	bill	despite	what	Greens	Leader	Cassy	O’Connor	saw	as	
some	‘horrible	amendments	’117.		
	If	we	 didn’t	 pass	 it	 amended…	 the	whole	 four	 years	 (of	 the	 TFA	 negotiation	
process)	would	have	been	a	waste	of	time…	So	we	had	to	pass	a	flawed	piece	
of	legislation	rather	than	send	it	back	(to	the	Legislative	Council)	upstairs	where	
we	were	almost	certain	it	would	die.118		
	
IMLC	Jim	Wilkinson	proposed	amendments	to	improve	the	durability	of	the	bill	despite	his	
personal	opposition	to	the	TFA	process119.	He	recognised	that	the	bill	was	likely	to	pass	and,	
although	he	did	not	support	it,	wanted	it	to	be	the	best	it	could	be120,	as	befits	the	Council’s	
role	of	legislative	review121.	
	Overall,	the	Council	leveraged	the	committee	process	to	significantly	flesh	out	the	bill,	making	
58	successful	amendments	and	adding	over	two	hundred	pages	to	what	was	the	most	heavily	
amended	bill	in	the	Council’s	history122.	This	included	the	addition	of	two	new	Clauses,	a	new	
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115	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	26	March	2013,	p.	1-65.	
116	The	Hon	C	Farrell	MLC,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	16	April	2013,	p.	9.	
117	O’Connor	Interview.	
118	O’Connor	Interview.	
119The	Hon	J	Wilkinson	MLC,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	16	April	2013,	p.	8.	
120	Wilkinson	Interview.	
121	D.	Chalmers,	‘Looking	Forward:	Some	Thoughts	on	the	Operation	of	the	Legislative	Council	in	the	Next	
Century’,	in	A.	Fletcher	(ed.),	Operation	of	the	Legislative	Council:	Discussion	Brief,	Hobart,	Parliament	of	
Tasmania,	1997:	5-15.	
122	Legislative	Council,	Annual	Report	2012-2013,	Hobart,	Legislative	Council	of	Tasmania,	2013.	
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Part	and	seven	new	Schedules,	showing	clear	evidence	of	legislative	and	policy	influence123.	In	
this	case	the	committee	and	review	process	afforded	influence,	involving,	not	just	IMLCs,	
although	they	were	prominent,	and	not	just	those	supportive	of	the	bill.	It	is	for	other	research	
to	determine	whether	or	not	this	influence	was	indeed	politically	motivated124.	Certainly	the	
forest	peace	process	was	a	novel	one,	negotiated	by	conservationists	and	the	forestry	industry,	
and	legislated	for	by	a	government	bill	that	was	heavily	amended	in	the	Council.	
	
DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSIONS	
Literature	describing	the	power	of	Tasmania’s	Legislative	Council	tends	to	focus	on	its	
staggered	elections	and	its	capacity	to	block	budgets	without	having	to	face	the	electorate.	
There	is	some	recognition	of,	and	focus	upon,	the	continuously	independent	nature	of	the	
Council,	the	implications	for	its	accountability,	and	parties’	sporadic	attempts	to	pick	up	seats.	
However,	nothing	previously	has	been	written	about	the	means	by	which	independent	
members	influence,	in	their	view,	policy	and	pursue	their	own	agendas125.	It	is	clear	from	this	
research	that	such	members	do	use	the	Council’s	powers	to	influence	policy,	but	also	to	
primarily	ensure	that	legislation,	supported	or	otherwise,	is	of	the	highest	standards.	
For	reasons	of	scope,	we	have	limited	our	investigation	into	the	influence	of	IMLCs.	We	have	
not	undertaken	politicisation	analysis,	for	example,	and	instead	considered	IMLCs’	action	as	
impartial	despite	many	having	seen	it	as	conservatively	aligned.	We	have	not	been	concerned	
with	how	politics	is	prosecuted	in	a	Westminster	house	of	review,	therefore,	but	with	
opportunities	for,	and	instances	of,	influence	being	pursued	in	the	uniquely	independent	
Legislative	Council.	Not	surprisingly	these	opportunities	and	instances	arise	in	the	course	of	
the	Council’s	normal	review	and	scrutiny	work,	although	some	IMLCs	strategies	are	more	
successful	than	others,	as	we	have	seen.	And	some	take	longer	to	be	realised	than	others.	
Nevertheless,	one	of	our	interviewees	did	comment	on	politicisation.	Most	obviously,	
independents	may	front	for	parties	that	are	seeking	influence	and	control	of	the	Council	or	its	
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members	and	processes.	Party	aligned	independents	could	then	review	government	business,	
and	initiate	inquiries,	in	terms	of	party	interests	rather	than	electorate	or	state	interests.	They	
may	alienate,	marginalise	or	attempt	to	shut	down	any	sign	of	true	independence	by	an	IMLC,	
such	as	by	Ruth	Forrest	for	example,	who	is	active	in	speaking	her	mind,	in	particular	in	
critiquing	state	finances	and	accountability	processes126.	Conversely,	Craig	Farrell,	previously	
LGLC	and	now	President	of	the	Council,	considers	his	independence	to	be	critical,	and	
unhindered	by	his	membership	of	the	Labor	party127.	
Our	findings	are	that	despite	its	long	held	reputation	as	conservative	and	obstructionist,	the	
data	suggests	that	the	Council	plays	a	healthy,	but	not	obstructive	role	in	amending,	but	not	
overly	amending,	legislation,	although	clearly	the	TGA	bill	was	an	exception.	Private	members	
bills	appear	to	play	a	marginal	but	at	times	potentially	an	important	role,	less	so	by	their	
direct	adoption,	but	often,	according	to	our	interviewees,	by	influencing	government	
legislative	initiatives	at	a	later	stage.	IMLCs	have	a	blocking	majority	in	the	Council,	so	it	is	
crucial	that	government	cultivates	good,	reciprocal	working	relations	with	them.	In	turn,	
where	this	is	the	case,	an	IMLC	may	secure	a	policy	win	just	by	having	a	conversation	with	a	
Minister128	but	do	so,	our	interviewees	stressed,	not	for	personal	gain,	but	for	achieving	the	
best	outcomes	for	the	State.	
We	found	that	IMLCs	use	the	committee	process	as	intended,	namely	to	scrutinise	the	
executive,	but	that	they	can	leverage	this	process	aggressively	against	the	wishes	of	
government	by	seeking	enhanced	public	deliberation	and	evidence	gathering.	While	
government	may	resist	this,	it	invariably	recognises	the	power	of	these	committees,	and	
respects,	and	very	often	implements,	their	recommendations.	We	found	that	it	may	also	
choose	to	ignore	them,	only	to	subsequently	offer	its	own	version	of	these	recommendations	
as	its	own	initiative.	In	all	of	their	review	and	scrutiny	work,	IMLCs	are	sole	operators,	not	
supported	by	party	colleagues	or	resources,	and	can	be	denied	access	to	drafting	services,	so	
they	are	on	their	own	and	must	build	relations	to	gain	support.	However	most	of	our	
interviewees	saw	benefit	in	lack	of	party	alignment	for	affording	a	broader	range	of	working	
relationships.	
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We	observed	that	government	does	not	respond	well	to	attempts	by	the	Council	to	increase	
its	powers.	Whilst	IMLC	Jim	Wilkinson’s	PMB	led	to	more	regular	reporting	of	financial	data,	
IMLC	Ruth	Forrest’s	PMB	attempt	to	scrutinise	regulations	before	they	were	enacted	failed.	
There	is	much	research	still	to	be	undertaken	of	the	Council.	The	electorate	work	and	
priorities	of	MLCs	is	undocumented,	as	is	the	MLC/IMLC	dynamic,	and	MLC/IMLC	follow	
through	on	campaign	promises.	Our	focus	was	on	the	opportunities	for	policy	influence	of	
IMLCs	who	dominate	the	Council.	We	asked	IMLCs	about	their	role,	the	strategies	they	use	to	
gain	policy	influence,	their	work	and	influence	on	committees,	and	the	obstacles,	including	
party	political	obstacles,	to	achieving	influence.	Virtually	all	of	our	interviewees	see	their	role,	
not	only	as	reviewing	and	scrutinising	government,	but	also	as	exerting	initiative	and	
influencing	policy,	which	on	the	whole,	they	do	see	as	part	of	the	function	of	IMLCs	in	an	
upper	house	of	review.	
	
